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Case Summaries
CERCLA
U.S. v. Bestfoods et al., 118 S.
Ct. 1876 (1998)
The United States
brought suit against former own-
ers and operators of a chemical
facility to recover the costs of
cleanup of the site. Under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA'),
an operator of a polluting facility
may be held responsible for these
costs. The statute does not clearly
define the word "operator" The is-
sue in this case was whether a par-
ent corporation could be liable, as
an operator, for cleanup costs for
pollution caused by a subsidiary's
facility under CERCLA's definition.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
The Court stated that one
way for a parent corporation to
be liable for its subsidiary's facility's
pollution was ifthe corporate veil
could be pierced. The Court rec-
ognized the long-standing principle
that parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations are separate legal entities,
but also recognized the vulnerabil-
ity of the veil under certain circum-
stances, such as when the corpo-
rate form is used for wrongful pur-
poses. The Court noted that ap-
plication of CERCLA does not in-
terfere with the corporate veil and
does not interfere with the excep-
tions to piercing it.
The Court then examined
the liability of parent corpora-
tions themselves as operators of
their subsidiary facilities. Under
CERCLA, "operator" is defined
circularly Noting the statute's lack
of clarity, the Court stated that an
operator "must manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically re-
lated to pollution." This includes
making decisions about environ-
mental regulation compliance, as
well as decisions concerning leak-
ing waste or disposal of hazardous
waste.
In analyzing the case, the
Court stated that the focus should
not be on the relationship be-
tween the parent and the subsid-
iary, but between the parent and
the facility in question. The
Court mentioned that if parental
control over the subsidiary were
extensive, this control likely cre-
ated a veil-piercing issue. The
Court noted that it was appropri-
ate for parent corporation offic-
ers to be joint officers of a sepa-
rate subsidiary and criticized the
District Court was criticized for
attributing the actions of joint
officers to the parent corporation.
The Court found that operator
liability cannot be established
solely on the grounds that dual of-
ficers made policy decisions and
directed activities at a subsidiary fa-
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The Court cautioned that
a dual officer could deviate so far
from the normal behavior of a
joint officer as to exert parental
control over the facility. A par-
ent corporation officer, with no
position in the subsidiary, may
also exert enough control over a
facility to make the parent cor-
poration liable under CERCLA.
According to the Court, the key
inquiry is whether the parent cor-
poration exceeded accepted
norms of "parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility," to be deter-
mined by examining the degree and
detail of the parent corporation's
activities involving the subsidiary's
facility.
In remanding this case
for further findings, the Court
noted that the parent corporation
had an officer at the subsidiary
(not as a joint or dual officer).
The Court noted that the District
Court stated that this officer was
involved in environmental mat-
ters at the subsidiary facility, and
that the officer directed the regu-
latory inquiry responses of the
subsidiary. The Court noted that
these facts were enough to raise
the issue of parent corporation
control of the facility, but refused
to reach a conclusion based on
these facts. The case was re-
manded for introduction of more
facts could be obtained about the





Inc. v. Sierra Club 118 S. Ct.
1665 (1998)
The Sierra Club brought
suit in Federal District Court
against the United States Forest
Service, pursuant to the National
Forest Management Act of 1976
("NFMA"), challenging the Land
and Resource Management Plan
("LRMP") for Ohio's Wayne
National.Forest. The Ohio For-
estry Association, whose mem-
bership includes those who har-
vest timber from the Wayne Na-
tional Forest, intervened as a de-
fendant.
The Sierra Club brought
this action challenging the LRMP
on the grounds that it was based
on erroneous analysis and:led to
wrongly favoring logging and
clearcutting in Wayne National
Forest, in violation of the NFMA,
the National Environmental
Policy Act the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Sierra Club
also claimed that the Forest Ser-
vice violated its role as "public
trustee" by permitting implemen-
tation of the plan, and that de-
fendants failed to identify eco-
nomically unsuitable lands, in
violation oftheir authorizing stat-
ute. The Sierra Club sought re-
lief in the form of a declaration
that the plan, including below-
cost timber sales, and
clearcutting, was unlawful; an
injunction prohibiting further
timber harvesting and below-cost
timber sales, pending plan revi-
sion; and costs and attorneys
fees.
The Forest Service ar-
gued that the suit was non-justi-
ciable because the Sierra Club
did not have standing to sue, and
that the Sierra Club's claims
were not ripe for adjudication.
Supporting its defense, the For-
est Service asserted that the
LRMP did not authorize the cut-
ting of any trees, although it did
setting logging goals, select ar-
eas of the forest suited to time
production and determine prob-
able methods of harvest. Before
permitting logging, the Forest
Service must meet several re-
quirements, including providing
those affected by proposed log-
ging notice and an opportunity to
be heard. The statute further re-
quires the Forest Service to re-
vise the plan, as appropriate. For
these reasons, the Forest Service
argued that LRMPs are not final
agency action and therefore are
not ripe for review.
The district court granted
summary judgment to the Forest
Service, holding that the Forest
Service acted lawfully in making
the various determinations chal-
lenged by the Sierra Club. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that the
Sierra Club had standing to bring
suit, the suit was ripe for review,
and the Sierra Club should be
permitted to go forward with its
claim. The impact of the Sixth
Circuit's holding of justiciability
was that the Sierra Club need not
wait for a site-specific action to
occur before challenging the
plan. The Sixth Circuit also held
that the LRMP violated the
NFMA by improperly favoring
clearcutting.
The United States Su-
preme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit, on appeal, holding that,
while the Sierra Club did have
standing, its suit was not ripe for
review. The ripeness requirement
protects agencies from interfer-
ence in carrying out their duties
until their decisions have become
final and the challenging party
can point to a concrete injury
they suffered as a result of the
agency's policy. Using the stan-
dards of (1) whether delayed re-
view would cause hardship to the
plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial
intervention would inappropri-
ately interfere with further ad-
ministrative action; and (3)
whether the courts would benefit
from further factual development
of the issue presented, the Court
held that the Sierra Club would
not suffer significant hardship
because "the Plan does not give
anyone a legal right to cut trees
nor does it abolish anyone's le-
gal authority to object to trees
being cut." Secondly, the Court
held that judicial review would
hinder the Forest Service's abil-
ity to refine its policies through
revision of the LRMP. Thirdly,
the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not intend for
LRMPs to be subject to judicial
review before implementation.
Such review would preempt the
Congressionally mandated sys-
tem by which the Forest Service
is makes logging decisions. Fi-
nally, the Court noted that chal-
lenges to LRMPs would require
time-consuming judicial consid-
eration, wuch might turn out to
be unnecessary, should the
agency amend its plan.
The Sierra Club's argu-
ment that it had suffered imme-
diate harm producing a claim
ripe for review was rejected on
procedural grounds of lateness.
The Sierra Club argued that the
immediate harm resulted from
the LRMPs allowance of intru-
sive activities, such as the use of
heavy machinery and the nonex-
istence of "affirmative measures
to promote backcountry recre-
ation" in areas the plan desig-
nated for logging in Wayne Na-
tional Forest. Because this argu-
ment did not appear in the Sierra
Club's complaint, the Court re-
fused to hear it on appeal. How-
ever, the court acknowledged
that, had the complaint raised this
claim, the substantial harm re-
quired to meet the ripeness doc-
trine would have existed.
The Supreme Court's
holding in this case decided a
split between the circuits by
holding that LRMPs are pre-
cluded from judicial review un-
til site-specific action, causing
actual and substantial harm, has
occurred. It is unclear from this
case, however, whether all future
LRMPs will be found non-justi-
ciable on the grounds of ripeness
or whether substantial harm will
be found when pleadings include
facts similar to the Sierra Club's
late claim of immediate harm.
Becky Cull
RCRA
Harmon Industries, Inc. v.
Browner, No.-97-0832-CV-W-
3, 1998 WL 574421 (WD. Mo.
Aug. 25, 1998)
Harmon Industries, Inc.
("Appellant") filed an appeal in
the United States District Court
for the Western District of Mis-
souri challenging the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's
("EPA") final order, affirming
Appellant's federal penalty li-
ability under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). Prior to the institu-
tion of enforcement proceedings
leading to the EPA's final order,
Appellant discovered in Novem-
ber of 1987 that employees at its
Grain Valley, Missouri, assembly
facility unlawfully disposed of
large quantities of hazardous or-
ganic solvent wastes between
1973 and 1987. Upon this dis-
covery, Appellant's management
ordered its employees to cease
this disposal practice, changed its
assembly process, thereby ex-
cluding the use of hazardous
cleaning materials, and ordered
Phase I, II, and III environmen-
tal audits of the facility's
grounds.
The Phase I report not
only noted the presence of haz-
ardous wastes in the soil, but also
that no danger to human health
or the environment existed.
Based upon this and the fact that
such disposal practice ceased, the
Phase II report concluded "a vi-
able option would be to leave the
organic compounds in the ground
with a very small risk of future
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environmental problems." Fi-
nally, the Phase III report stated
that Appellant's discontinued
solvent disposal practice "did not
pose a threat to human health or
environment." Thereafter, Ap-
pellant voluntarily notified and
collaborated with the Missouri
Department of Natural Re-
sources ("MDNR") regarding the
cleanup at the facility.
In conjunction with the
cleanup MDNR dated May 29,
1990, and October 15, 1990, the
EPA Region VII stated that
MDNR should assess civil mon-
etary penalties against Appellant.
The EPA also threatened to in-
stitute a separate action against
Appellant if the MDNR failed to
initiate a formal enforcement
action involving penalties against
Appellant within 30 days. On
September 30, 1991, EPA Region
VII filed a four-count adminis-
trative complaint against Appel-
lant seeking over two million
dollars in civil penalties. Dur-
ing that same month, the Mis-
souri Attorney General's office
issued to Appellant a first draft
of a consent decree, which con-
ditionally waived civil penalties
and a subsequent enforcement
action provided that Appellant
investigated and remedied the
contamination at the site and sub-
mitted semi-annual documenta-
tion, demonstrating Appellant's
attempt to obtain liability insur-
ance in order to comply with
RCRA's financial assurance and
liability requirements. In addi-
tion, the decree included terms
to the effect that "compliance
with [the] [c]onsent [d]ecree con-
stitutes full satisfaction and re-
lease from all claims arising from
allegations contained in [the
State of Missouri's] petition."
After some revision, Appellant
and the MDNR signed the decree
on November 19, 1992, and
January 4, 1993, respectively. On
March 5, 1993, the State of Mis-
souri filed the consent decree
along with a petition against Ap-
pellant in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri; that
day, the court entered and ap-
proved the decree.
Following the state
court's approval of the consent
decree, the EPA's Administrative
Law Judge ("AL") held an ad-
ministrative. evidentiary hearing,
regarding the penalty issue, de-
cided against Appellant on all
counts, and rendered a decision
imposing civil penalties against
Appellant for all counts, totaling
$586,716. In imposing penalties
against Appellant, the ALJ char-
acterized Appellant's conduct as
creating either major or moder-
ate potential of harm pursuant to
the EPA's RCRA Civil Penalty
Policy and Civil Enforcement
Policy. Appellant Harmon Indus-
tries appealed the ALJ's decision
to the EPXs three-judge Environ-
mental Appeals Board ("EAB"),
which affirmed the penalty deci-
sion on March 24, 1997. Appel-
lant then filed this action against
the Director of the EPA on June
6, 1997.
Appellant challenged the
EPA's interpretation that §
6926(b) and (d) do not preclude
the EPA from seeking a civil pen-
alty as authorized by § 6928.
"The EPA contends that the
states can have hazardous waste
programs but the EPA can always
override, or overfile, the state's
enforcement action." Appellant
relied on the plain language of §
6926, specifically the "same
force and effect" and "in lieu of'
provisions, and the language of
the consent decree. In contest-
ing the EPA's statutory authority
to overfile and seek a civil mon-
etary penalty when a state with
an EPA-authorized hazardous
waste program has resolved the
issue without a penalty, Appel-
lant further asserted that res ju-
dicata principles estopped the
EPA's subsequent imposition of
liability on Plaintiff. Finally,
Appellant contended that the
EPA's civil penalty is time-barred
under the federal statute of limi-
tations and that the penalty is ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and not supported by
substantial evidence.
The district court began
its opinion by setting forth the
standard of review employed by
courts when examining final ad-
ministrative decisions pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). The court stated
that it must defer to the EPA's
construction of §§ 6926 and 6928
if such construction is consistent
with the unambiguous letter of
the law or represents a reason-
able interpretation in the face of
ambiguity.
.The court found the plain
language the statute determina-
tive in finding "that the M1DNR
operates 'in lieu of' or instead of
the federal program." In addi-
tion, the court found that the
EPA's delegation of authority, the
Memorandum of Agreement be-
tween the two agencies and the
legislative history support the
notion that the EPA and MDNR
have concurrent authority over
RCRA rather than co-existing
equal enforcement powers. The
court resolved that the EPA only
has the option of withdrawing its
authorization of an inactive state
program under § 6926(e); not the
power to reject and override part
of an authorized state's settle-
ment in a particular case when
the EPA finds the penalty inad-
equate. Furthermore, the court
found that §§ 6928(2) and
6926(e) are not inconsistent and
must be read together, otherwise
authorized state actions would
not have the "same force and ef-
fect" as federal actions pursuant
to RCRA § 6926(d). Finally, the
court concluded that the EPA did
not have the statutory authority
to overfile because "the EPA's in-
terpretation of RCRA [contra-
dicts] the purposes behind autho-
rizing state hazardous waste pro-
grams."
In determining the res
judicata effect of the consent de-
cree, the court applied the
Hickman rule. Under Missouri
law, Hickman embodies the rule
that "estoppel by a former judg-
ment, or res judicata, requires:
(1) identity of the thing sued for,
(2) identity ofthe cause of action,
(3) identity of the persons and
parties to the action, and (4) iden-
tity of the quality of the person
for or against whom the claim is
made." Applying this rule, the
court determined that the only
issue was whether the EPA was
in privity to the state court action
and consent decree, to which it
was not a party. The court con-
cluded that resjudicata under the
federal statute barred the EPA
from imposing penalties on Ap-
pellant because, under Hickman,
MDNR and the EPA were in priv-
ity where the MDNR's actions
were taken for the interests of the
EPA under RCRA.
Although the Missouri
district court agreed with the
EPA's arguments that the statute
of limitations had not run due to
the continuous violations excep-
tion and that substantial evidence
supported the EPAs penalty as-
sessment, the district court re-
versed the EAB's decision with
respect to the EPA's authority to
pursue overfiling. The court
found that the EPA lacked the au-
thority to overfile because the
plain language and reasonable
interpretation of the statute did
not lend support for the existence
of such authority.
WSRA
Sierra Club North Star




("MDOT") and the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation
("WDOT") wanted to build a
four-lane bridge across the
Lower St. Croix River, a part of
the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System under the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act
("WSRA"). Traffic congestion
and safety issues spurred MDOT
and WDOT to work together to
replace one of the bridges on the
river and to modify the ap-
proaches to it.
To get the project under
way, agencies issued an Environ-
mental Impact Statement, which
is required by the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, and a Sec-
tion 4(f) Statement required by
the Federal Transportation Act.
Although the statements recom-
mended the construction, the
proposed project would have sig-
nificant impact on the bed and
banks of the river and require
extensive dredge and fill activ-
ity. The Federal Highway Ad-
ministration ("FHA") approved
the plans in November 1995, and
the construction contracting was
set to begin.
However, in June 1996,
the Sierra Club North Star Chap-
ter and Voyageurs Region Na-
tional Park Association filed suit
against the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation, the FHA,
the Department of the Interior
("DOI") and the National Park
Service ("NPS") to stop con-
struction on the project, alleging
that DOI had violated Section
7(a) of the WSRA, 16 U.S.C. §
1278(a) (1994), by not determin-
ing whether the Project would
have a direct and adverse effect
upon the values for which the
Lower St. Croix was included in
the WSRA. In September 1996,
the NPS instructed the United
States Coast Guard and the Corps
of Engineers to put MDOT's per-
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nut requests on hold. Shortly
thereafter, the FHA rescinded its
authorization of the construction
pending the outcome of the Sec-
tion 7 determination. MDOT
and WDOT asserted cross-
claims against the Interior Sec-
retary and NPS Director disput-
ing the determination that the
bridge was a "water resources
project" within the WSRA and,
therefore, required a Section 7
evaluation.
In December 1996, NPS
issued a Section 7 determination,
finding that the proposed bridge
constituted a "water resources
project" and that the project
would directly and negatively
affect the conditions that allowed
the river to be included under the
WSRA. Pursuant to this report,
NPS blocked issuance of neces-
sary construction permits or au-
thorizations by the applicable
federal agencies.
MDOT moved for an or-
der vacating the NPS determina-
tions. MDOT claimed the NPS
decision was arbitrary, capri-
cious, and in excess of statutory
authority. The Sierra Club North
Star Chapter and Voyageurs Re-
gion National Park Association,
the United States, and the City
of Oak Park Heights filed memo-
randa opposing the motion.
The United States Dis-
trict Court for Minnesota held
that when a river is classified as
part of the Wild and Scenic River
System, a bridge construction
project over the river would
qualify as a "water resources
project" under the WSRA. The
court recognized the act's stated
purpose was to preserve the in-
cluded rivers' "free-flowing con-
dition ... for the benefit and en-
joyment of present and future
generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1271
(1994). The court began by ob-
serving that "water resources
project" is not defined anywhere
in the WSRA, and no case law
exists on the question. In addi-
tion, the court found that no leg-
islative history specifically ad-
dressed the issue.
The court then turned to
whether the WSRA permitted the
Secretary of the Interior's
("Secretary's") treatment of the
bridge as a "water resource
project." Because the Depart-
ment of the Interior was respoh-
sible for defining the phrase, the
court accepted as reasonable the
Secretary's interpretation of"wa-
ter resources project," which in-
cluded "any type of construction
which would result in any change
in the free-flowing characteris-
tics of a [wild and scenic] river."
MDOT made several ar-
guments that revolved around
what it deemed insufficient no-
tice. MDOT claimed Section 7
had been applied inconsistently
to bridge projects. However, the
court found no evidence of vari-
ance in the statute's application.
In addition, MDOT argued that
the Secretary inconsistently ap-
plied Section 7 to the particular
project at issue in this case, an
argument the court refuted. In
its final notice argument, MDOT
said it should not be penalized
because of the Secretary's fail-
ure to publish the interpretation
of "water resources project" in
the Federal Register as required
by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). The court did not
find this argument persuasive,
because the evidence showed
that the responsible agencies re-
peatedly gave MDOT notice that
its proposed bridge project would
be subject to the WSRA.
In addition, MDOT chal-
lenged the Section 7 determina-
tion itself First, MDOT argued
that the NPS erred because Con-
gress did not include the Lower
St. Croix in the statutory river
system for its scenic qualities
and, therefore, the NPS should
not consider the scenic impact of
the bridge. The court rejected
this argument because MDOT
confused the values for which a
river is established under the
WSRA, which rest on the river's
inherent attributes, with the
river's classification under the
act, which is based on the amount
of development in the river area.
MDOT's second basis for
challenging the NPS Section 7
decision was that the determina-
tion that the construction would
have direct, adverse effects on
the area was arbitrary and capri-
cious. However, the court found
that the NPS made detailed find-
ings on all issues.
MDOT also argued that
the necessity of a project should
be a controlling factor in an
evaluation. The court rejected
this proposition, stating that there
is no evidence in the WSRA or
its guidelines that discuss taking
need into consideration. Subse-
quently, the court upheld the
broad NPS interpretation of "wa
ter resources project."
Lisa R. Robinelt
